Introduction
The Wind of Change The Cold War was a war of sorts in which the targets were the hearts, the minds, the souls, and the perceptions of the "enemy." Author Carl Builder tells us the walls of the Cold War were "breached not by military forces, diplomacy, alliances, or economic power, but by information spewing out of television sets, telephones, audio and video tapes, computers, and facsimile machines, into the minds of the individuals." 2 Clearly, there were pronounced differences in living standards between the West and the East during the Cold War. The imbalance was so large it prompted Zbigniew
Brzezinski in his book, The Grand Failure, to predict the fall of the Soviet Union.
Specifically, Brzezinski cited huge East-West divergences in per capita GNP, world trade, telephones, motor vehicles, and infant mortality. 3 In addition to others, these factors were significant in setting the stage for the collapse of Russian communism.
Although economics played a central role in the fall of the Soviet Union, information served as the catalyst that brought about that fall. The information flow took many forms. For example, information reached the East European masses through the ceaseless message of Voice of America. Also, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost campaign of openness unleashed strong impulses for reform in key Soviet urban centers. 4 Both uses of information served to enlighten the masses to the need for change.
The point is this: information used strategically can be effective in precipitating change. The fall of the Soviet Union is one example that proves this. Another was the Vietnam War, a so-called "conflict" in which tactical victories on the battlefield were not enough to overcome a strategic loss of will power among the American people.
Likewise, in this instance, the hearts and minds of the opposing populations proved to be more important strategic objectives than any particular piece of ground, any lopsided body count, or any air-to-air kill ratio.
As information continues to fuse the world together into a single global community,
American leaders must develop a strategic information policy that promotes democratic principles and American leadership abroad as stated in its national security strategy.
The Third Wave: America's Chance to Lead
Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major-perhaps the major-stake in the worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control over access to and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor.
-Jean François Lyotard
Few would argue with the idea the world is undergoing an information explosion.
Futurist Alvin Toffler describes this fantastic age as history's third major wave of change-the "Third Wave." 6 Characteristics of the Third Wave include a rapid increase in the quantity and speed of transmitting digitized information, a staggering rate of change in information systems and concepts, and questions that befuddle governments and military forces as to how they should "fight for control" of information to achieve their respective ends.
The United States currently has the technological lead in the Third Wave era. In The American Economy: The Struggle for Supremacy in the 21 st Century, Nicolas Spulber informs us that, in a 1991 review of 94 technologies, the United States was either the leader or was highly competitive in about two-thirds of the technologies considered. 7 These included computer-aided engineering, certain electronic components, a vast number of information-related techniques, and high-level software languages. 8 The United States must capitalize on its lead in information technologies by formulating a complete strategic approach to information operations that takes advantage of America's strengths and minimizes inherent weaknesses. Now is the time to act.
A poem by Ella Wheeler Wilcox suggests America controls her own fate if she so decides:
One ship drives East, and another drives West, By the self-same gale that blows; 'Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale, That determines the way she goes.
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Wilcox reminds us it is not the environment that determines the ship's direction: it is the tack taken by those at the helm. Likewise, American leadership can choose to succeed or fail at the task of developing an information strategy that affords a fair chance of achieving its stated national security objectives.
While addressing the Air War College Class of 1998 a senior Air Force officer surprised listeners by saying, "The Air Force was never about airborne platforms; it was about fresh thinking!" 10 The speaker was using past tense, but his words may prove to be prophetic. 
Information: A Strategic Phenomenon
In cyberspace, national borders are no longer relevant. Electrons don't stop to show passports.
-President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
The foundation underlying this thesis is that information is inherently strategic in its nature. As the quote states, information ignores international borders. It is a strategic phenomenon that defies imprisonment; it is widespread, inexpensive, and persistent; it seeks to be free. Any strategy designed to leverage information power must account for its inherently strategic nature.
Why is Information Inherently Strategic? Information Reaches Everyone
President Reagan once said, "Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the walls topped by barbed wire, it wafts across the electrified borders." 2 The former U.S. president had a sixth sense for the unstoppable power of information.
In today's rapidly evolving computer and communications revolution information has indeed taken on strategic significance. This is more true today than previously due to the widespread and still growing electronic interconnectivity provided by radio, television, telephones, fax machines, video teleconferencing, and proliferation of home computers interconnected through the World Wide Web. We are now living in the midst of the third great revolution in history…. Today, the marriage of computers and telecommunications has ushered in the Information Age, which is as different from the Industrial Age as that period was from the Agricultural Age. Information technology has demolished time and distance. Instead of validating Orwell's vision of Big Brother watching the citizen, the third revolution enables the citizen to watch Big Brother. And so the virus of freedom, for which there is no antidote, is spread by electronic networks to the four corners of the earth.
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Clearly, Wriston has captured the strategic essence of information. He believes the convergence of computer and communications technology has caused the world to become a single, global community-a true linkage of rich and poor, north and south, east and west, and city and countryside.
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Information is the enabler of this linkage. As such, information is the catalyst that has facilitated the re-forming of attitudes and perceptions of the masses, governments, international economics, and militaries; its effects have proven both pervasive and persistent. Information's qualities of pervasiveness and persistence, then, are key elements of its strategic nature.
The Media-Information's Turbocharger
The media have the effect of turbocharging information thereby enhancing its already strategic nature. The largest contributor in this regard is the medium of television, bringing real-time events to living rooms worldwide twenty-four hours a day through as many as seven worldwide competitive networks such as CNN.
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In this way, the media play a significant role in enhancing the strategic reach of information.
Senior leaders have become painfully aware of the power of the media. They realize real-time dissemination of shocking graphical information gathered from a tactical situation may lead to strategic consequences.
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For example, the media's ability to almost instantaneously transmit images of death and mutilation can profoundly shape national and international public opinion.
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Through manipulating public opinion, the media can ignite or constrain government action. For example:
Beginning with Vietnam, the American public increasingly has had access to video images of U.S. military operations, with a consequent impact on policy. In the days following the introduction of U.S. troops to Haiti in 1994, bloodshed in the streets of Port-au-Prince was broadcast live, leading to immediate White House decisions to redefine the responsibilities of U.S. soldiers to control civil strife. 10 The danger with the media is that its power is unchecked. If allowed unabated to influence the American or foreign public, the media can become a factor in determining American strategy. This is not necessarily bad; however, there is a danger the media can be a knowing or unwitting accomplice to unfriendly forces thereby influencing American strategy in a negative way. For example, imagine if Hanoi, which conducted an impressive international psychological campaign against the U.S. in Vietnam, had today's information age capabilities at its disposal. 11 The effects of the North Vietnamese information campaign could have been even more dramatic than they actually were. The
Vietnam conflict was a vivid example of the case in which a nation's military can be busy winning operational battles while losing the strategic war in the hearts and minds of the its people in part because of the media.
Alvin Toffler asserts the media have recently undergone de-massification. This de-massification had the effect of breaking up large newspaper, magazine, radio, and television giants of industrial age society. In their place, customized media have sprung up that specifically target the interests of their audiences. 12 Toffler notes this has begun a new era in which a new info-sphere is emerging. This will have the effect on the most important sphere of all, the one inside our skulls. 13 The minds of the populace are therefore susceptible to precision marketing made possible by the de-massified media.
Leaders who fail to understand information is a strategic phenomenon yield the advantage to those who do. The successful governments of tomorrow will be those that formulate information strategies that account for the inherently strategic nature of information. 13 Ibid., 165.
Notes
Chapter 3
America's Information Strategy: Two Critical Shortfalls
America's information strategy has two major weaknesses. First, the military has been allowed to take an operational approach that focuses on winning battles instead of using information in a broader context to support the political, economic, and information instruments of national power. Second, the national government has not provided a coherent national strategy toward information. At best, national initiatives have been fragmented and uncoordinated.
Shortfall #1: The U.S. Military's Operational Approach to Information
The United States government has allowed the military establishment to develop its own approach to information that emphasizes the operational level of war. Former conventional, force-on-force concept of the battlespace. 2 The result of this operational approach is that information is a support tool whose objective is creating an interactive "picture" of the battlespace to lessen the fog of war. Such a view ignores the strategic power of information to diffuse hate propaganda, to spread democratic ideals, and to convince an opponent he has lost the battle before it has begun. No matter how well it is done, command and control warfare on the battlefield is fighting done too late and is capable of achieving only tactical effects.
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This paper does not dispute the fact that operational-level information superiority is necessary to achieve victory on the battlefield. In fact, it asserts information dominance on the battlefield is an essential part of a complete strategic approach to information operations. But, in and of itself, General Shalikashvili's vision of information superiority on the battlefield does not constitute a strategic approach to information operations.
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In other words, battlefield command and control warfare superiority is a necessary but incomplete approach to information operations. It fails to exploit America's current technological superiority at the strategic level. To fully exploit this advantage the military's vision must broaden into the strategic realm. But this will not happen until military leaders accept the inherently strategic nature of information. But a new, more radical and strategically oriented mindset may be emerging. Joint Pub (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, has yet to be published although the draft version is now undergoing coordination. Draft JP 3-13 is a bold attempt to alter the force-on-force paradigm by elevating the importance of information operations to a level commensurate with the strategic importance of information as described in the previous chapter. Specifically, it acknowledges a role for information operations at the strategic level of war. It also recognizes the need to conduct information operations during peacetime as well as during war. 13 The following excerpts indicate a non-traditional way of thinking about information operations (IO):
Offensive IO may be the main or supporting effort of a JFC's [Joint Force Commander's] campaign or operation, or a phase of these.
14 IO can help deter adversaries from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the United States or its allies/coalition partners. 15 These quotations reflect thinking far beyond traditional approaches to information.
It is revolutionary to suggest that information operations may be the main effort and they can deter conflict. These ideas should raise eyebrows among Clausewitz's followers and smiles among Sun Tzu's. After all, the idea of bloodshed was central to the theories of Clausewitz. 16 On the contrary, Sun Tzu advised us, "Those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. It recognizes that information has progressed from an adjunct to weapons to being widely recognized as a weapon or target itself. 19 It also introduces the strategic, and somewhat radical, notion of information in support of the "boundless battle."
War in the future is unlikely to be bounded by the geographical restrictions of terrain and distance. This "boundless battle" includes continual nonlethal combat prior to the application of traditional military force (if any). One intent of the "boundless battle" is to achieve objectives with limited normal force applications or possibly averting normal force application altogether. The "boundless battle" will, in all likelihood, incorporate economic and political "combat" using information and information technology to employ the economic and political instruments of national power in a coordinated and effective manner. 20 If AFDD 2-5 and JP 3-13 obtain approval without substantive changes, they will spearhead a significant shift in the traditional military way of thinking about information.
Toffler has also noted this shift in doctrinal paradigms. He observes a strategic shift in doctrinal thinking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Defense University, West Point, the Analytic Science Corporation (a private think tank), and other intellectuals.
The new concepts are going beyond the operational realm into the strategic by introducing information as a "strategic asset" that can alter high-level decisions of the opponent and actually deliver a knockout punch before the outbreak of traditional hostilities.
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Shortfall #2: The Government's Fragmented Information Policy
The popular author of Information Warfare, Winn Schwartau, offers a national information policy for consideration. 22 Schwartau's suggestion of a national policy underscores the fact America has no recognizable overarching information strategy. At best, the American government has undertaken piecemeal efforts that have resulted in a fragmented and problem-ridden information policy. Captain Stephen A. Rose, a Navy Judge Advocate General, describes this approach using the analogy of a "car with a good engine, a bad transmission, three steering wheels and no road map." 23 We will analyze three key problem areas of the government's approach. These are: (1) the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), (2) unresolved organizational and legal issues, and (3) the unclear role of strategic information operations.
(1) PCCIP: An Insufficient Approach.
The PCCIP does not offer a complete strategic approach to information for three reasons. First, it addresses only defensive issues. Second, it addresses only tactical-level threats. Third, its recommendations are designed to insure the integrity of the communication network that is exploitable by unfriendly actors at the strategic level. We shall discuss these inadequacies after reviewing some background information on the PCCIP.
Background. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was
formed in 1996 amid rumors of a possible electronic Pearl Harbor. President Clinton appointed the commission by executive order and tasked it to propose a national policy for protection and assurance of the nation's critical national infrastructures.
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The commission was comprised of representatives from federal departments and agencies as well as the private sector. It also had a designated team that addressed information and communications concerns.
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The commission did its job well. It produced an enlightening study that revealed an increasing national dependence on electrical energy, communications, and computers. It also uncovered vulnerabilities to physical attack, cyber threats, recreational hackers, criminal activity, terrorism, and information warfare.
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The study made numerous recommendations as to how these vulnerabilities can be minimized. But the study fell short of satisfying the requirement for a national information strategy for three reasons.
A Defensive Approach. Because the PCCIP addresses only defensive issues it does not
constitute a complete information strategy. The President's executive order empowered the commission only to identify infrastructure vulnerabilities and recommend possible solutions to them. There was no tasking or authority to investigate offensive uses of information in any way.
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A Tactical-Level Approach. The PCCIP dealt only with physical and cyber threats at the tactical level. Specifically, it addressed physical threats such as dynamite or fertilizer bomb attacks as well as cyber attacks made probable by a growing computer-literate population, adoption of common public protocols that have increased system interconnection, and "hacker tool" libraries.
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The study was not tasked to address strategic issues such as the vulnerability of the American public to deliberate misinformation campaigns executed through the American communications infrastructure. The web, for example, can and is used for niche marketing by various businesses. It can as easily be used as a means to disseminate hate propaganda or other dangerous and uncensored messages specifically targeted at vulnerable interest groups. The PCCIP did not investigate strategic vulnerabilities, only tactical ones.
The PCCIP Insures the Availability of the Communications Network for Unfriendly
Actors. An unavoidable, but detrimental, side-effect of the PCCIP is that its recommendations seek to insure the integrity of a communications infrastructure that can be used by groups hostile to the United States. By insuring the integrity of America's communication networks, unfriendly actors with hostile intent are guaranteed direct access to the nation's strategic center of gravity-the minds of the American people.
Thus, hostile nation-states and ill-intentioned extremist groups are empowered via their assured access to the world's most interconnected public. 29 Ironically, they have the cooperative effort of the American government and industry to thank for providing it to them.
The web is not only a potential information weapon; it can support physical attacks as well. For example, the commission's report points out information readily available on the web may disclose to a terrorist the best place to set explosive charges for maximum disruptive effect.
(2) Organizational and Legal Problems-Who Defends American Cyberspace?
There are troublesome organizational and legal problems standing in the way of a workable national information operations policy. Organizational and legal issues are so closely intertwined it is logical to discuss them together. The heart of the issue centers on the question of who should be responsible for defending America's information infrastructure.
Opinions vary as to where that responsibility lies. Should it be the U.S. military, the civil sector, or a government agency like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or the Department of Justice (DOJ)?
The Military. First, consider the military. The military has several tools that seem to make it the logical choice to defend our nation's infrastructure including cyberspace.
These include the pillars of defensive information operations namely information assurance, physical security, operations security, counter-deception, counter-psychological operations, electronic protection, and special information operations. 31 The military also has robust intelligence assets, such as monitoring capabilities, that support these measures. 32 It also has highly trained and experienced personnel. The capabilities of the military seem to make it a perfect match for the task. This is the opinion of author Winn Schwartau who feels it is the most appropriate organization for the job. 
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The government must put forth a realistic plan that is sensitive to conflict of interest problems regarding the civil sector's aversion to sharing information concerning security matters. An illustrative example is the banking industry which is reluctant to report electronic vulnerabilities because the potential public relations fallout is too great.
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There are problems in assigning tasks and responsibilities for the civil sector because they are not legally enforceable. The idea of government and civil information sharing is noble, but it cannot succeed on good will alone. It can not be assumed civil authorities will feel comfortable relinquishing information, particularly regarding their own vulnerabilities, to the government for fear of leaks or abuse. The government may have to institute laws mandating sharing of information regarding information system weaknesses.
A Government Agency-CIA, FBI, or DOJ. Third, why shouldn't a government agency such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Department of Justice be responsible for defense of the national infrastructure? Unfortunately, there are constitutional problems with this idea.
In "Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy," Walter Wriston informs us, "The bureaucratic distinctions between intelligence and law enforcement, between permitted surveillance at home and abroad, may be unsuited for information warfare. There are no borders in cyberspace to mandate these distinctions." 40 Wriston also points out the dilemma of working to resolve legal responsibilities in the areas between the First Amendment and national security, and the right to privacy through encryption and the National Security
Agency's desire to breach it.
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Constitutional restrictions therefore make it difficult to assign perfectly distinct organizational responsibilities between government agencies in the Information Age.
This was intentional, not accidental. Years ago, the framers of the constitution purposely separated certain legal authorities to allow for checks and balances among the three branches of government. Consequently, the authority of government agencies to collect and disseminate information was intentionally "stovepiped" by legal statute, executive order, or regulation. 42 A phenomenon of cyber attacks that adds to the interagency problem is the difficulty in determining who is making the attack. The inherent anonymity makes for a wrenching legal problem as to who is empowered to investigate. The PCCIP report confirms this by stating, "With the existing rules, you may have to solve the crime before you can decide who has the authority to investigate it." 43 Under yesterday's laws, government agencies can not effectively provide for the surety of the nation's information infrastructure.
The consequences of not resolving which organization or organizations are responsible for the nation's cyber defense are serious. America's national security, global economic competitiveness, and domestic well being are at stake.
(3) Strategic Information Operations-How Far Should America Go?
America has no clear policy that clarifies how far it will go in using strategic information operations to achieve its goals. By strategic information operations, we are referring to the idea of psychological operations applied on a strategic scale through the full array of modern communications channels including the internet. Psychological operations are defined as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. 45 In other words, the information revolution is overtaking the world, the internet is growing rapidly-already a system of 70,000 networks-and nobody knows if or how U.S. leaders are going to use its information advantage in a strategic way to implement the national strategy of engagement. The U.S. government is not taking a proactive stance in this regard. Instead, it is choosing to address national security objectives through more conventional means such as diplomacy and economics.
There are reasons for and against developing a clear policy regarding strategic information operations. Unfortunately, American leadership has not exercised its leadership in stating to what degree the nation will use its information edge in pursuing national policies and in what way this will be accomplished.
Reasons For Supporting Strategic Information
Operations. There are three sound reasons for aggressively pursuing information operations at the strategic level.
These are that the U.S. has agencies already in place with a history of substantial success, the U.S. has an exploitable information advantage, and strategic uses of information can enhance America's other instruments of national power.
First, the United States already has organizations that have a solid start in getting its strategic message out. Examples are the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and its broadcasting arm, the Voice of America. Both of these have histories that include success stories. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens point out:
USIA's international broadcasting arm, the Voice of America, has in the last few years become the primary news source for 60 percent of the educated Chinese. 46 The U.S. military services also have substantial psychological operations capabilities including experienced organizations and refined doctrinal procedures.
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Second, the U.S. currently enjoys an advantage in information technologies that can be put to effective use. The U.S. edge stems from its ability to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information. This edge is likely to grow in the next decade. 48 Nye and
Owens suggest this information advantage can be put to use in various ways. These include aiding democratic transitions in the remaining communist and authoritarian states, promoting democracies, preventing and resolving regional conflicts, addressing terrorist threats, international crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and damage to the environment. 49 They also note, "America's increasing technical ability to communicate with the public in foreign countries, literally over the heads of their rulers via satellite, provides a great opportunity to foster democracy. It is ironic to find Strategic information operations thus differ from military information warfare in two important ways: IO spans the conflict spectrum from peace to war and back to peace, and it involves all elements of the national government, not solely the military. These are important considerations precisely because the effort and coordination needed to engage the entire panoply of government organs is a particularly difficult and sensitive affair. 58 Thus, the inherent difficulties of the interagency process serve as negative factors making strategic information operations a difficult option to plan and execute.
Fourth, employing information in a strategic way involves more than just the government. This is because the strategic use of information involves the art of statecraft in integrating economic, military, diplomatic, technological, and other forms of national power, including civilian information capabilities. The number of web sites is rapidly increasing, each espousing its own customized viewpoint. The way the world communicates today is driven more by people like Bill
Gates than governments. Some experts argue the international communications technology is causing the very erosion of the nation-state system. 66 The national security strategy fails to mention strategic or any other use of information as an instrument of power. This is ironic in a document that emphasizes the "imperative of engagement." 67 Instead, it refers to traditional tools such as diplomacy, monetary assistance, arms control, nonproliferation initiatives, and military activities such as forward stationing and deployment of forces, exercises, and nuclear deterrence.
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The only reference to information at all is a single, three-sentence paragraph stating the nation must protect its information infrastructure. This is an obvious reference to the President's Committee on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The PCCIP was discussed earlier where it was shown the PCCIP does not offer an adequate national information strategy.
In summary, regarding strategic information operations, the government has taken a position by not taking a position. The result is a disconcerting fragmentation of effort.
The U.S. military is developing information operations doctrine that is at best superfluous to the national security strategy and at worst in conflict with it. The civil sector is proceeding in disparate directions motivated by the profit motive. The legal and judicial systems eschew fundamental legal and constitutional issues. The lack of government guidance has therefore resulted in disjointed efforts by the nation's military, civilian, legal, and judicial entities.
Notes Recommendations
The American government's failure to formulate and implement a cohesive national approach to information operations is a plan for strategic failure. The change in thinking will also require changes in officer recruitment, the professional military education system, and non-commissioned officer career management. The industrial era recruitment of scores of engineers thinking in terms of mass production to support a Cold War strategy of attrition must give way to recruitment of a different kind of officer. Officers of the future must be historians, political scientists, regional experts, and, in a way, diplomats that understand the subtle power involved in knowing and appreciating a nation's language and culture. Assignments should focus on developing officers as European, Pacific, South American, or Asian experts and emphasize reassignment to their regions of expertise. Also, the non-commissioned officer corps can no longer be mass numbers of soldiers that comprise armies of attrition; they must be the world's most highly trained experts capable of handling the unpredictable demands of situations such as sensitive peacekeeping operations in front of CNN cameras.
Second, the national security strategy must grow to incorporate information as an essential strategic element of national policy. The lack of such mention highlights a conflict between a strategy of engagement and a fragmented approach to strategic information operations that fails to support that strategy.
Third, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection work was a good effort, but it fell short of providing the proactive dimension of a complete information strategy. The national strategy must clearly state how the current American advantage in information technologies will be leveraged. This is the most critical factor in establishing a coherent national plan for effective use of information at the strategic level.
